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 1 
The Essential Connection between Epistemology and the Theory of 
Reference 
 
Epistemology is the study of the conditions for knowledge. The theory of 
reference seeks to explain what makes it the case that singular terms, for example, proper 
names like ‘Bertrand Russell’ and demonstratives like ‘this’, stand for particular things. 
Recent philosophical tradition contains many instances where discussions in one of these 
fields draw on or illuminate the other: consider the alliance between causal theories of 
reference and causal theories of knowledge1, or the claim that understanding a genuinely 
singular term involves a special epistemic relation (‘acquaintance’) with its bearer2. 
However, this paper argues that the link between epistemology and the theory of 
reference is much more fundamental than the survey of extant proposals which I shall not 
prolong proceedings by attempting would suggest. A right theory of reference will be 
built around a principle bringing out the tie this paper’s title advertises: there is an 
essential connection between epistemology and the theory of reference; this connection is 
a conduit through which influence flows irresistibly from each branch of inquiry to the 
other.  
But before beginning the main discussion, I must say a little to clarify the ‘theory 
of reference’ part of its target.  
The early twentieth century discussion of singular terms threw itself at three 
questions at once: 
 
The question of formal semantic value – How should a singular term like ‘Bertrand 
Russell’ be treated by a theory laying out how the truth value of a sentence depends on 
contributions made by its constituents? 
 
The question of aboutness-fixing3 – What makes it the case that the thought a speaker 
uttering a sentence like ‘Bertrand Russell was a philosopher’ intends to express is about a 
particular individual? 
 
The question of linguistic reference – What makes it the case that, in the absence of 
special stage setting, a speaker uttering a sentence like ‘Bertrand Russell was a 
philosopher’ is rightly treated as expressing a thought about Russell? 
 
For example, consider Russell’s own descriptivism about proper names. This was all 
three of a theory of semantic value, a theory of aboutness-fixing, and a theory of 
linguistic reference. Russell said that a sentence containing a proper name is an 
abbreviated form of a sentence containing a description, so that it is in terms of the 
underlying, description-containing sentence that the initial sentence’s inferential 
properties are to be explained.4 (This is a proposal about formal semantic value.) He said 
                                                   
1 See for example Benacerraf 1973 p. 671. 
2 Russell 1956a. For a contemporary defence of this claim see Recanati 2010. For a contemporary counter-
argument see Jeshion 2010. 
3 In the terms introduced in Kripke 1977, this is the question of what fixes the ‘speaker’s reference’ of a 
token singular term. 
4 1956b 242-3 
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that a particular is introduced as relevant to the truth or falsity of the thought a subject 
using a proper name intends to express in virtue of the fact that the subject associates the 
name with a description the particular satisfies.5 (This is a proposal about aboutness-
fixing.) And he said that speakers are using tokens of a type proper name as a name for 
the same individual – as a name that introduces the same individual as relevant to the 
truth or falsity of the thoughts expressed by sentences containing it – iff they associate 
the name with appropriately related descriptions.6 (This is a proposal about linguistic 
reference.)  
 However, one thread in the subsequent narrative has been the painful 
abandonment of this ‘all at once’ approach. It is a now familiar point that there are 
coherent frameworks which treat the three questions (almost) independently.7 And even 
explaining, let alone motivating, a particular stand on their exact connection would 
require too much philosophy to be attempted here. For this reason, I shall suppose no 
specific view of the relationship between the three target questions of the traditional 
theory of reference. Instead, I shall restrict the discussion to just one of them: the 
question of aboutness-fixing. So the essential connection I am going to bring out is, in the 
first instance, a connection between epistemology and the theory of aboutness-fixing. We 
should expect this initial connection to generate some further connections between 
epistemology and the theories of linguistic reference and formal semantic value. But I 
shall not begin to explore what these might be.  
 I shall also restrict the discussion further by focussing, for most of the paper, on 
what I shall call ‘ordinary’ thoughts about particulars. These are thoughts of the kinds 
standardly made available by perceptual links with ordinary material things; 
understanding of proper names used to refer to them; and grasp of mundane (non-
scientific) descriptions. Here are three examples to illustrate the varieties of ordinary 
case: 
 
Case 1 You are looking at an orange on a table in front of you. The viewing conditions are good; the 
situation devoid of causal or cognitive perversity: you are having an ordinary perceptual experience, caused 
by the orange in an ordinary way. You form beliefs you would express by saying things like ‘That is round’ 
and ‘That is rolling’. 
 
Case 2 You have not heard the name ‘Aneurin Bevan’ before. Somebody begins to explain who Bevan 
was: ‘Aneurin Bevan was a British Labour Party politician. He was a long-standing member of parliament, 
and a cabinet minister in the 1940’s and 50’s. He was instrumental in the foundation of Britain’s National 
Health Service.’ Nothing about the situation leads you to doubt your informant’s reliability. You take the 
utterances at face value, forming a body of beliefs you would express using ‘Aneurin Bevan’. 
 
Case 3 ‘Tremulous Hand’ is used by scholars of medieval texts to refer to the otherwise unidentified 
author of around 50 000 Thirteenth Century glosses in manuscripts. (Palaeographical analysis provides 
strong evidence that these glosses are the work of a single person with distinctive (tremulous and left-
leaning) handwriting; all that is known about Tremulous Hand is what can be deduced from the glosses 
                                                   
5 1912 p 55 
6 1912 p 57 
7 For example, consider Kent Bach’s combination of views about proper names. Bach is a metalinguistic 
descriptivist about the formal semantic values of proper names (2002), a causalist about the aboutness of 
the thoughts we most often use them to express (2010), and denies that there is such a thing as linguistic 
reference (2006). 
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themselves.) Finding out that the name is used in this way, and having ambitions to make your mark among 
the medievalists, you look for evidence for ‘The author of the glosses was…’ claims, and use them as a 
basis for building up a body of beliefs you would express using ‘Tremulous Hand’  
 
I shall call the kinds of thoughts illustrated by Cases 1-3 ‘perceptual demonstrative’; 
‘proper-name-based’; and ‘description-based’ thoughts respectively.  
 In making this suggestion, I do not suggest that the only cases of aboutness are 
ordinary ones – an unforgivably feudal stipulation given that everyday usage would 
describe us as thinking ‘about’ electrons; numbers; events; and systems of government; 
and as having thoughts about ordinary objects not made available in one of the ordinary 
ways. Rather, the suggestion is that thoughts about particulars should be regarded as a 
natural kind of which ordinary cases are the central exemplars. According to standard 
treatments8, an attempt to explain what it takes to belong to a specific natural kind should 
not start by taking the kind’s boundaries for granted. It should start with central 
exemplars of the kind; try to provide an account of what they have in common at an 
appropriate level of explanatory depth; then use this account of the deeper commonality 
at the level of ‘real essence’ to decide where the kind’s boundaries lie. The overall 
account of aboutness of which this paper is a component has this same structure. The 
suggestion is that we treat Cases 1 – 3 as central exemplars of a cognitive natural kind. 
The first step in determining the boundaries of the kind is to find what is, in effect, its real 
essence – an account of how aboutness is fixed in these central cases. Given this account, 
we can ask where the kind’s boundaries lie by asking to what extent features of the 
account of aboutness-fixing that has been developed for central cases applies to these 
other cases too.  
 The paper has three parts. §1 argues for the principle connecting epistemology 
and (the aboutness-fixing part of) the theory of reference that I want to propose. §2 gives 
a first indication of how this principle promises to illuminate the fields of inquiry it 
connects. §3 considers what I take to be the most urgent and illuminating objections.   
  
 §1 REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION 
 
This section argues for a principle connecting epistemology and the theory of 
reference. The argument begins with two more basic principles, one connecting 
aboutness and truth, the other truth and justification: 
 
Principle connecting aboutness and truth – If a belief is about an object, its truth or 
falsity depends on what the object is like. (If my belief that Jack has fleas is about my 
dog, it is true iff he has fleas.) 
 
Principle connecting truth and justification (approximate version) – Justification is truth 
conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, the better your justification for a belief, 
the more likely its truth, so that if you form a justified belief, you will be unlucky if it is 
not true and not merely lucky if it is.  
 
                                                   
8 Tracing their modern history to Kripke 1977 and Putnam 1975. 
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The argument I am about to develop combines these two principles – one connecting 
aboutness and truth; the other truth and justification – to yield a direct connection 
between aboutness and justification: a principle which brings out the significance for 
accounts of aboutness of the fact that justification is truth conducive. Here is this third 
principle in preliminary and approximate form: 
 
Principle connecting aboutness and justification (approximate version) – The beliefs a 
subject expresses using a singular term are about an object iff their means of justification 
converges on the object, so that, given how the beliefs are justified, the subject will be 
unlucky if they do not match the object and not merely lucky if they do.  
 
To consolidate what this principle says, consider a situation where a telescope is 
focussed on some particular object. The fact that the telescope is focussed on the object 
does not guarantee that the information it delivers will match properties the object 
actually has. It does guarantee that this information will match the object unless some 
unlucky spoiler intervenes. The aboutness and justification principle treats thinking about 
objects as a kind of focus: the fact that a body of justified beliefs is about an object does 
not guarantee that the beliefs will match the object. It does guarantee that when this 
match fails the situation is somehow unlucky: where a justified belief is about an object, 
it will match the object unless some unlucky spoiler intervenes. 
 Of course, this approximate version of the principle cries out for clarification. At 
least partial clarification will have been achieved by the section’s end. 
 The argument for the (clarified) aboutness and justification principle requires 
prior clarification of the truth and justification principle, which has itself been stated in 
mere approximate form: the author will not insult the reader by presenting an argument 
that relies on such terms as ‘unlucky’ and ‘in general and allowing exceptions’. However, 
though I take the need to recognise some version of  the truth and justification principle 
to be common ground9, the question of how to make this principle precise is a matter for 
inquiry in its own right, not to be addressed in a section of a paper on something else. So, 
though it is necessary to work with some precise version of the principle, the version I 
shall adopt is not one for which I shall attempt a comprehensive defence. Rather, it is the 
precisification I find most plausible. An alternative precisification of the truth and 
justification principle would necessitate adjustments in both the argument for the 
precisified aboutness and justification principle, and in this principle itself. However, I 
am confident both that something very like the argument to come, and something very like 
the principle it delivers will remain standing regardless of the fine-tunings that alternative 
versions of the truth and justification principle might require. 
  The precisified truth and justification principle with which I shall operate is most 
easily motivated using an example. Consider a commonplace belief: my belief that it is 
snowing outside, formed on the basis of what I see out the window and my prior 
knowledge that I am in a city whose miserable climate makes snow a frequent hazard at 
this time of year. In this case, my perceptual experience and prior knowledge give some 
                                                   
9 If this suggestion worries you, note that it is consistent with all of the following: the possibility of 
justified false belief; the possibility that there are kinds of normative good order for belief that are not truth 
conducive; the possibility of a virtuous but unlucky subject who is always justified but never right; the 
possibility that the notion of justification should itself be explained in terms of that of knowledge.  
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justification for believing that it is snowing outside. This justification – which we would 
usually regard as sufficing for the belief’s rationality – rules out many ‘not snowing 
outside’ circumstances. (That is, the factors that contribute to the justification together 
entail that these circumstances are not actual.) But it is a familiar philosophers’ niggle 
that the justification we ordinarily regard as securing rationality in this kind of case does 
not rule out all the circumstances where the belief is not true. For example, in the case at 
hand my justification does not rule out the possibility that it is fine outside and the 
drifting feathery white objects I can see are fake snowflakes being released by a film 
company. But, just as familiar as the niggle is the observation that worrying about arcane 
or unusual belief-not-true possibilities does not, and should not, hold up the path to 
belief. The cognitive resources available for the construction and maintenance of our 
belief systems are limited relative to the myriad ways a given belief might – just might – 
fail to be true. It would be a poor use of these limited resources to seek justification that 
rules out even arcane, seldom-encountered not-p circumstances before forming the belief 
that p. Instead, we should almost always ignore arcane possibilities, treating justification 
that rules out ordinary not-p circumstances as sufficient for rationality. This strategy will 
sometimes – in cases where an arcane or unusual not-p circumstance happens to be actual 
– leave us with false beliefs that meet the ‘justified enough for rationality’ standard. Such 
is the humble condition of belief-formers whose cognitive resources are eclipsed by the 
actual and potential complexity of their environment.10  
 The elements of the precisified truth and justification principle with which I shall 
operate can be read off this brief discussion of the ‘bounded rationality’ that characterises 
our cognitive lives. I shall suppose that a path to belief formation provides some 
justification for a belief iff it rules out a sufficiently large and varied range of ways the 
belief might fail to be true. I shall say that a belief is ‘rational’ (justified up to the point of 
rationality) iff it would have been an inappropriate use of cognitive resources to seek 
further justification – to expand the range of eliminated belief-not-true circumstances – 
before forming it. And I shall say that a circumstance in which a belief is not true is 
‘rationally relevant’ iff a belief formed on the basis of justification that does not exclude 
it is thereby irrational. Together these elements generate the following precisification of 
the truth and justification principle, which I shall call ‘TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION’: 
 
TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION Justification that secures the rationality of a belief rules out 
every rationally relevant circumstance where the belief is not true.11  
 
(I hasten to point out that I do not take myself to have proven this principle. This note12  
discusses one obvious point where some people’s preferred precisification of the claim 
that justification is truth conducive might depart from what I have proposed.)  
                                                   
10 I intend to be endorsing the ‘bounded rationality’ framework of, for example, Bratman 1987. 
11 Compare Lewis 1999 p 36 – TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION is parallel for the case of rational belief of 
Lewis’s claim that S knows that p iff S believes that p and p is true in every relevant circumstance 
uneliminated by S’s evidence, though for the case of TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION the ‘relevance’ is relevance 
to rational belief not relevance to knowledge. TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION leaves open the possibility that 
standards ascribing  rational belief might vary with features of the believer’s, the ascriber’s, or the 
assessor’s context. 
12 I have endorsed an ‘all-ist’ account of the range of circumstances that must be eliminated by rationality-
securing justification: rationality-securing justification for the belief that p must eliminate every rationally 
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 With TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION in place, we can proceed to the argument for the 
precisified aboutness and justification principle. The principle itself is a biconditional 
connecting aboutness and a precisified notion of justificatory convergence. We can argue 
for the left-to-right direction of the biconditional (from aboutness to justificatory 
convergence) like this: 
 
Suppose  
 
1 S’s belief that <α is Φ>13 is about o. 
 
Add the aboutness and truth principle: 
 
2 If S’s belief that <α is Φ> is about an object, the belief is true iff that object is Φ14. 
 
1 and 2 entail 
 
3 S’s belief that <α is Φ> is true iff o is Φ. 
 
Add TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION: 
 
4 Justification that secures a belief’s rationality eliminates every rationally relevant 
circumstance where the belief is not true. 
 
3 and 4 entail  
 
5 Justification that secures the rationality of the belief that <α is Φ> eliminates every 
rationally relevant circumstance where o is not Φ. 
 
Having derived 5 from 1, we have one direction of our biconditional: 
 
6 If S’s <α is Φ> belief is about o, justification that secures the belief’s rationality 
eliminates every rationally relevant circumstance where o is not Φ. 
  
But what about the other direction, running from justificatory convergence to 
aboutness? I regret to say that the argument for this part of the biconditional is more 
intricate. 
As a first step towards both seeing the need for additional intricacy and bringing 
out how the argument works, consider ‘holistic’ models of justification. According to 
such a model, a belief is never justified in isolation: any factor that contributes to 
                                                                                                                                                      
relevant not-p circumstance (circumstances that need not be eliminated are thereby rationally irrelevant). 
An obvious alternative is a ‘most-ist’ account: rationality-securing justification must eliminate most 
rationally relevant not-p circumstances. The choice between these options is too complex a matter to 
consider here.  
13 ‘<α>’ and ‘<Φ>’ range over subject-place-occupying and predicate-place-occupying propositional 
constituents respectively. 
14 ‘<Φ>’ and ‘Φ’ are braced together: <Φ> is a propositional constituent representing property Φ. 
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justifying it does so only in relation to an array of other beliefs, so that the factor really 
contributes to justifying a whole network of beliefs – the new belief together with the 
background array. It is widely accepted15 that justification in the construction of scientific 
theories does work like this. For example, consider how observation of a trail in a bubble 
chamber justifies a researcher’s belief in the existence of some sub-atomic particle. Just 
the observation on its own could have no such impact: it is not as if the researcher has 
observed the particle itself! Rather, the observation makes its justificatory contribution 
against the background of the researcher’s beliefs (a) in the scientific theory which 
predicts that such a trail will be generated in circumstances X iff the particle exists, and 
(b) that the experimental set-up has created circumstances X. And in fact the observation 
also adds to the researcher’s justifications for the beliefs at (a) and (b) – if no trail had 
been observed, the researcher would have revisited first (b) then the more vulnerable 
elements of (a). So the observation is providing justification for belief in the particle’s 
existence and the beliefs at (a) and (b) all at once.  
Now suppose for the moment that all justification is ‘holistic’ in something like 
this sense. The hopelessness of trying to establish the kind of clean link between 
justificatory convergence and aboutness stated by the right-to-left direction of the 
aboutness and justification biconditional is an immediate result. Given the 1 – 6 
argument, we know that a factor that raises the level of justification across a network of 
beliefs about some range of particulars also raises the chances that more of the beliefs in 
the network will get right more of the properties of the objects they are about. But if all 
justification for the beliefs in a network is holistic – if every justificatory factor raises the 
chances that each belief will match the properties of the object it is about – the facts 
about justificatory convergence are themselves holistic, and leave the facts about 
aboutness for individual beliefs undetermined.  
However, it is a careless philosopher who moves from confirmation holism about 
scientific theories to the conclusion that justification is holistic across the board.16 And in 
fact it is a now widespread observation that justification for what I have called ordinary 
beliefs is not ‘holistic’ in anything like the sense that seems applicable for scientific 
theories. Recall the cases of ‘perceptual demonstrative’ and ‘proper name based’ beliefs 
illustrated by Cases 1 and 2 respectively. Though there is room for wide-ranging debate 
about exactly how justification works in these cases, it is rare to find a contemporary 
philosopher espousing holism about either. And the ‘bounded rationality’ picture of our 
cognitive lives that is already in place lets us both consolidate just how implausible this 
extension of the holistic model would be, and bring out the outlines of what must be said 
instead.  
To see this, consider a subject seeking to build an accurate account of some range 
of evolving particulars given a stream of information – reasonably generous but also very 
incomplete – as to how properties are distributed across this range at various times, and 
under the assumption that the information is fallible but generally reliable. (I take this to 
be our actual situation.) Because the information is incomplete, the subject must fill in 
                                                   
15 Following Duhem 1914 
16 Though I shall not try to argue for this diagnosis, I take the fashionability of this move in mid to late 
Twentieth Century epistemology to provide part of the explanation of how the principle I am about to 
defend has remained so long concealed.  
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gaps in the picture the information provides. And because it is fallible, the subject must 
treat each incoming item as potentially to be re-interpreted or discarded.  
In the broadest terms, there are two kinds of strategy by which this challenge 
might be addressed. The first is whole-heartedly holistic: interpret incoming information 
and fill gaps to achieve a picture meeting some holistic standard such as simplicity or 
coherence. The second strategy allows that there are beliefs which stand or fall together, 
but treats holistic connections as a check on belief formation, rather than as woven into 
the path to belief. A subject adhering to this second strategy will employ a policy of 
default acceptance of the deliverances of the information feed, treating this initial 
acceptance as revisable in the face of coherence requirements on the system as a whole.  
Which strategy is optimal will depend on further details. Supposing that the 
distribution of properties across the objects from which the subject is receiving 
information in fact is simple and/or coherent, and given high enough capacities for 
storing information and calculating how one thing’s probable Φ-ness impacts another’s 
possible Ψ-ness, the first, wholeheartedly holistic strategy might well prove effective. 
But this first strategy’s feasibility falls off with decline in either the actual 
simplicity/coherence of the distribution of properties, or the capacities available for 
storage and calculation. Where these capacities are low relative to what would be 
required to execute the first strategy, then, provided that the information feed is 
sufficiently reliable, the other comes to the fore: the subject should take the incoming 
information at face value, while remaining sensitive to the possibility that beliefs formed 
by default uptake from the information feed will – on comparatively rare occasions – 
require revision to maintain coherence across the picture as a whole. 
With this contrast in place, I take it to be a matter of empirical fact that it is the 
second version of the challenge we ourselves face when in the business of forming beliefs 
like those in Cases 1 and 2, and the second kind of solution that we adopt.17 In each case, 
the incoming information feed is all of reliable, fallible, and gappy. Given much larger 
storage and information-processing capacities, it might be feasible to treat this incoming 
information as input to a wholeheartedly holistic strategy for constructing a picture of the 
world. But it is a matter of fact that the available capacities are restricted in just the way 
that makes wholehearted holism impracticable. And it is a matter of fact that the 
reliability of the incoming information feed is sufficient to favour the alternative ‘default 
acceptance with sensitivity to defeaters’ strategy instead.  
In what follows, I shall suppose that each family of ordinary beliefs is associated 
with its own characteristic ‘default acceptance with sensitivity to defeaters’ justificatory 
strategy. For cases of perceptual demonstrative belief, like Case 1, the strategy is uptake 
from the information delivered through an attentional perceptual channel, with suitable 
sensitivity to factors that undermine perceptual reliability. For cases of proper-name 
based belief, like Case 2, it is uptake from a stream of testimony containing appropriately 
related token proper names and pronouns, with, again, suitable sensitivity to reliability-
undermining factors. For description-based cases like Case 3 it is use of a description to 
                                                   
17 One source of empirical support for this claim comes from developmental psychologists’ findings of the 
shift, as cognition matures, from ‘high temperature’ models of reasoning, in which the subject ‘bounces 
around the space of hypotheses like a molecule bouncing around in a hot liquid’ to ‘low temperature’  
models, which are biased towards more usual outcomes, so are efficient generators of ‘good enough’ 
conclusions. Gopnik et al 2015 p 90. 
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harvest information (for example, looking for evidence for <The author of the glosses 
was Φ> beliefs, and marshalling the resulting <…was Φ> findings into a body of beliefs 
you would express using ‘Tremulous Hand’) with suitable sensitivity to the factors that 
suggest that you might be getting things wrong. I shall say that these justificatory 
strategies are ‘proprietary’ to their respective subclasses of ordinary belief.18  
 With the notion of proprietary justification in place, the argument for the right-to-
left direction of the biconditional needs just one more ingredient. This is what I shall call 
the ‘uniqueness lemma’: 
 
The uniqueness lemma – If the proprietary means of justification for a body of ordinary 
beliefs converges on object o, there is no o* ≠ o for which this is also the case.  
 
For perceptual demonstrative beliefs, the uniqueness lemma says that if there is some o 
whose properties you will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely lucky to get right if 
you form a body of beliefs justified by uptake from an attentional perceptual channel, 
there is no o* ≠ o for which this is also the case. For proper-name-based beliefs it makes 
the parallel claim for formation of a body of beliefs justified by uptake from a suitably 
unified stream of testimony. And for description-based beliefs it makes this claim about a 
body of beliefs anchored by the kind of means of justification associated with ‘Tremulous 
Hand’: looking for justification for <The Ψ is Φ>, and combining the resulting <…is Φ> 
findings into a body of beliefs which you treat as about a single thing.  
 The case for the uniqueness lemma rests on a contingent fact. Let us say that 
ordinary objects are ‘macroscopic duplicates’ iff they share all their macroscopic 
observational properties, both intrinsic (like being square or blue) and relational (like 
being two feet away from an orange sphere). Then it is a contingent fact that if our world 
contains macroscopic duplication, macroscopic duplicates are located nowhere near one 
another. If the cup on the table in front of me has a macroscopic duplicate, this thing has 
the cup’s same shape, size, and colour, and is located in the corner of a table qualitatively 
indistinguishable from this one at which someone qualitatively indistinguishable from 
me, standing in qualitatively identical relations to those in which I stand, types tokens of 
exactly these words. If this scene is unfolding anywhere, it is not on our planet or in our 
part of the universe: we know that the part of the universe with which we interact does 
not contain the kind of repetition and symmetry that this kind of duplication anywhere 
near us would require. However, it is consistent with everything we know that our own 
sector of space and time is one among multiple duplicate sectors, each repeating exactly 
the qualitative history of the others. If the cup and you and I have macroscopic 
duplicates, it is because this possibility – ineliminable by the factors that justify our 
beliefs about the empirical world – is actual: there is a region of space and time upon 
                                                   
18 The notion of proprietary justification has precursors in Dummett’s notion of canonical verification; 
Evans’s notion of a ‘controlling conception’; Campbell’s notion of a ‘dedicated’ path to justification; and 
Recanati’s notion of the ‘special way of gaining information’ associated with a mental file (see pp. 312-315 
of Dummett 1978; pp. 177-179; p. 145 and p. 174 of Evans 1982; Campbell 1999; p. 157 of Recanati 2010; 
and pp. 34-38 of Recanati 2012). 
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whose existence our ordinary empirical evidence is silent, but in which duplicates of us 
parallel our lives.19   
Having noted this contingent fact, we can argue for the uniqueness lemma like 
this. The proprietary means of justification for a body of ordinary beliefs is a sub-species 
of ordinary empirical justification. But ordinary empirical justification is silent about the 
existence of objects in sectors of space-time other than our own. And the proprietary 
means of justification for a body of ordinary beliefs is just a species of ordinary empirical 
justification. It will, therefore, leave the existence or not of objects in other sectors a 
matter of chance. But in that case, if the proprietary means of justification for a body of 
beliefs converges on some object, this must be an object in our own sector. However, if 
this means of justification were to converge on two objects, they would have to be 
macroscopic duplicates (if o and o* are not macroscopic duplicates, a means of forming 
<α is Φ> beliefs that reliably match o’s properties will not also be a means of forming 
beliefs that reliably track o*’s) . But there is no macroscopic duplication within our own 
sector. So where proprietary justification converges, it converges uniquely.20 
 And now we can argue for the biconditional’s right-to-left as follows: 
 
1 Suppose that subject S is maintaining a body of ordinary beliefs whose proprietary 
means of justification converges on object o, so that if S forms only <α is Φ> beliefs 
whose rationality is secured by this means, in each case either o is Φ, or the situation 
involves some factor that makes it rationally irrelevant from the point of view of 
formation of the <α is Φ> belief.  
 
2 There are three cases.  
(a) The beliefs are about some o* other than o.  
(b) They are about o.  
(c) They are about nothing. 
 
But materials already in place will let us establish 3: 
3 The beliefs are not about some o* other than o. 
 
Suppose that 3 is false: S’s beliefs as described in 1 are about some o*≠o . But given the 
uniqueness lemma, proprietary justification for a body of beliefs can converge on only 
one object. And in the case described at 1 it converges on o. So it does not also converge 
on o*. So 1, the uniqueness lemma, and the claim that S’s beliefs are about some o*≠o 
entail that S’s beliefs are about an object (o*) upon which their proprietary means of 
justification does not converge. And that contradicts the direction of the biconditional 
that we have already established: the claim that where there is aboutness there is 
justificatory convergence.  
 
And we can also see the rough shape of an argument for 4: 
                                                   
19 This observation was a central ingredient in the ‘puzzle about massive reduplication’ introduced in Ch1 
of Strawson 1959. 
20 I provide a more comprehensive version of this argument at Dickie 2015 pp 65-72, and discuss 
complications arising from the ‘problem of the many’ at Dickie 2015 pp 27-34.  
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4 The beliefs are not about nothing. 
 
For suppose that 4 is false – the beliefs are about nothing. Again, we have already shown 
that where there is aboutness there is justificatory convergence. So to suppose S’s beliefs 
as described at 1 about nothing is to suppose that wherever there is aboutness there is 
justificatory convergence, but that there is some extra condition on aboutness as well: 
where this condition is met, the subject’s beliefs are about the object on which 
justification converges; in cases of justificatory convergence where the extra condition is 
not met, aboutness fails. But the claim that there is some such extra condition cannot be a 
mere stipulation: it must be sustained by an account of the explanatory work the extra 
condition is required to do. And it is very hard to see what this explanatory work might 
be.  
 
2, 3, and 4 entail  
5 The beliefs are about o. 
 
And having argued from 1 to 5 we have a connection running from justificatory 
convergence to aboutness: 
 
6 Where the proprietary means of justification for a body of ordinary beliefs converges 
on o, the beliefs are about o. 
 
The 1 – 6 argument is valid. 2 is trivial. And if the uniqueness lemma is granted, the 
move to 3 is straightforward. The difficulty is at 4, for which we have, so far, only a 
rough and ready case. But for the sake of getting the proposal I want to make on the table, 
I shall treat this preliminary case for 4 as good enough to be getting on with, and upgrade 
it in §3.4 below.  
 Now let us put the two halves of the argument together. We first established a 
necessary condition on aboutness in general (6 on p5): 
 
If an <α is Φ> belief is about o, justification that secures the belief’s rationality 
eliminates every rationally relevant circumstance where o is not Φ. 
 
And the conclusion just established (6 immediately above) states a corresponding 
sufficient condition on aboutness for the special case of ordinary beliefs. Combining the 
two conclusions, and letting the less general claim drag the more general down with it, 
we get the full-dress version of the principle connecting aboutness and justification stated 
in preliminary form on p.3.  I shall call the full-dress principle ‘REFERENCE AND 
JUSTIFICATION’: 
 
REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION – A body of ordinary beliefs is about o iff its proprietary 
means of justification converges on o so that, for all <Φ>, if S has proprietary rationality-
securing justification for the belief that <α is Φ>, this justification eliminates every 
rationally relevant circumstance where o is not Φ.  
 
Here is a picture to consolidate what this principle says: 
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Body of beliefs  Proprietary means of justification   Object upon which proprietary justification 
converges  
 
The file-shape at the left represents a body of ordinary beliefs. The arrow represents its 
associated proprietary means of justification: uptake from a perceptual link; uptake from 
an appropriately unified stream of testimony; moving to <α is Φ> given justification for 
believing <The Ψ is Φ>.  REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION says that the body of beliefs is 
about o iff o is the object upon which its proprietary means of justification converges, so 
that, for all <Φ>, if the subject has an <α is Φ> belief rationally justified by this means, 
either o is Φ, or the mismatch traces to some devious or unusual factor the subject was 
not rationally required to anticipate.21  
 
 There are many points of detail still to be addressed, and a number of objections 
will probably spring to the reader’s mind. I shall discuss some objections, and in doing so 
fill in some details, in §3. But first I want to return to the promise made at the paper’s 
outset: I promised to establish a principle that provides new insights into both the theory 
of reference and the problem set of traditional epistemology. The principle is now in 
place. It remains to sketch how it might be put to work in the theory of reference, on the 
one hand, and epistemology in the other. That is the task of §2. 
 
§2 New foundations for the theory of reference; new tools for epistemology 
 
 This section gives a brief indication of how REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION 
promises to advance discussion in both the theory of reference and epistemology. I shall 
spend most of the section discussing the perceptual demonstrative and proper-name-
based cases, returning to the description-based case at its close. 
 Recall that in the terms introduced on p3, ‘perceptual demonstrative’ thoughts are 
thoughts of the kind standardly made available by attentional perceptual links, and 
standardly expressed using ‘this’ or ‘that’. ‘Proper-name-based’ thoughts are thoughts of 
the kind standardly made available by access to an appropriately unified stream of 
testimony. I shall consider how REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION changes the discussion of 
aboutness-fixing for these thoughts, then consider how it impacts their epistemology. 
The dominant strand in attempts to explain aboutness-fixing in the perceptual 
demonstrative and proper-name-based cases forms a catalogue of appeals to candidate 
causal relations and ‘because the object satisfies this description’ conditions, with 
attempts to refute or refine proposals built around familiar gambits of counterexample 
and adjustment: that can’t be the required causal condition because here is a case where 
                                                   
21 Note that bodies of belief are being individuated functionally (by their proprietary means of justification 
and their internal unity relations) rather than by what they are about.  
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intuition declares for aboutness but the proposed causal condition fails; this can’t be the 
required description because here is a case where the subject’s beliefs are about 
something other than the description’s satisfier.   
In hindsight, I think it is very obvious that this entire debate was taking place at 
the wrong level of explanatory depth. Even had the game of counterexample and 
adjustment enabled us to isolate causal or descriptive relations characteristic of each case 
– type relations tokens of which hold wherever there is perceptual demonstrative or 
proper-name based aboutness – we would still need reasons to think that these are 
relations that do aboutness-fixing work, rather than relations that happen to hold where 
and only where there is aboutness. But at the time of writing, the traditional, example-
driven discussion has failed even by the minimal criterion of having generated 
counterexample-proof suggestions as to what the causal, descriptive, or hybrid aboutness-
fixing relations in the perceptual demonstrative and proper-name-based cases might be.  
The REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION framework offers a unifying alternative to this 
traditional approach. REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION itself is neither a causalist nor a 
descriptivist principle. But it enables us to explain when a causal relation is doing 
aboutness-fixing work; when aboutness is descriptively mediated; and what causal and 
descriptive aboutness-fixing have in common. In the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION 
framework, an aboutness-fixing relation is a relation of cognitive focus; a relation that 
makes available a means of justification such that the subject will be unlucky if beliefs 
whose rationality is secured by this means do not match what the object is like, and not 
merely lucky if they do. A causal aboutness-fixing relation is a causal relation which 
secures this result. A descriptively-mediated aboutness fixing relation is a relation of 
cognitive focus where the means of justification deploys the subject’s grasp of a 
description. So REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION generates a new blueprint for accounts of 
perceptual demonstrative and proper-name-based aboutness-fixing. An account of 
perceptual demonstrative aboutness-fixing will explain how beliefs formed by uptake 
from an attentional perceptual link with an ordinary object are justified, and show how 
this justification converges on the attended thing. An account of aboutness-fixing for 
proper-name-based beliefs will answer the parallel questions for uptake from an 
appropriately unified stream of testimony: it will explain how the beliefs you form in a 
case like Case 2 (‘Aneurin Bevan’) are justified, and show how this justification 
converges on the bearer of your informant’s uses of the name. Since attentional 
perceptual links and testimony links are both kinds of causal relation, both kinds of 
aboutness-fixing will be treated as involving a causal relation to the object. Whether they 
should also be regarded as involving descriptive relations will depend on the details of 
the justificatory story in each case – it will depend on whether the means of justification 
in Cases 1 and 2 rest on the subject’s grasp of a descriptive condition.22  
 This sketch of how REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION offers a new start for accounts 
of perceptual demonstrative and proper-name-based aboutness-fixing also lets us begin to 
see how the neglected connection between aboutness and justification might illuminate 
traditional questions in epistemology. For perceptual demonstrative and proper-name-
based belief are also at the heart of old and ongoing epistemological debates – the debates 
about how perception and testimony can be sources of knowledge. In each case, 
                                                   
22 Ch 4 of Dickie 2015 discusses the perceptual-demonstrative case in much more detail. Ch 5 discusses the 
proper-name-based case. 
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REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION generates a constraint on right accounts of justification 
that feeds straight into the epistemological discussion.  
 This constraint’s potential for epistemological payoff can be illustrated using the 
traditional problem of deciding which typings of belief-forming methods count as 
epistemically relevant. Let us use the perceptual demonstrative case to bring out the 
traditional problem. There is a fact of the matter about the token path to belief formation 
in a specific case of perceptual demonstrative belief – this information-processing state 
precedes this one, which precedes this one, and so on. But a token path to belief 
formation may be assigned a type in myriad ways. In Case 1 as described, the beliefs are 
generated by uptake from an attentional perceptual link with an ordinary object. But what 
would count as forming a belief by the same method again? Does the relevant notion of 
‘sameness’ require that beliefs formed by ‘the same’ method be formed just by uptake 
from a perceptual feed? Or must the perceptual feed also be attentional? If the perceptual 
feed must be attentional, is it a requirement that there be an ordinary object at the other 
end of the attentional link, or does attention to ‘things’ like ripples and shadows count as 
well? Is the relevant typing of methods date-sensitive, so that Case 1-type beliefs would 
count as formed by one method on Tuesdays and Thursdays, but another on other days of 
the week? (Surely not, but why not?) A token method may be typed in multiple ways. 
Any proposal appealing to type methods of belief formation must justify the choice of the 
favoured typing over the host of other candidates.  
 This problem first came to prominence as an objection to ‘reductive reliabilist’ 
views of knowledge and justification – views according to which whether a belief counts 
as justified or as knowledge is claimed to be explicable in terms of whether it is formed 
by a reliable method, with the notion of a ‘reliable method’ treated as explanatorily prior 
to those of ‘knowledge’, ‘justification’, and their cognates. For the reductive reliabilist, 
asking whether a belief is justified just is asking whether it is formed by a reliable 
method. And the question of whether a belief is formed by a reliable method cannot be 
answered simply by considering whether it is true. Even in asking this question, we are 
treating the belief as formed by a method that is a token of a repeatable type: the question 
is whether tokens of the type method produce true beliefs across a sufficiently wide and 
varied range of circumstances.23  
But it is a familiar observation that stepping away from reductive reliabilism does 
not make the problem go away. For example, consider the widespread claim that there is 
a ‘safety’ requirement on knowledge: a true belief counts as knowledge only if the 
subject could not easily have been wrong in a similar case.24 A safety requirement is a 
requirement on how things could have gone differently given the same, or a sufficiently 
similar, means of belief formation. Would a sufficiently similar way of arriving at the 
belief that p, deployed in sufficiently similar circumstances, be sufficiently likely to 
generate truth? If ‘No’, the true belief that p is unsafe, so not a case of knowledge. Many 
philosophers who are not reductive reliabilists endorse safety requirements. And anybody 
doing so must explain what counts as a ‘sufficiently similar’ path to belief formation. 
Though abandonment of reductionist ambitions widens the range of options available in 
answering this question, the problem of explaining why one typing should be preferred to 
others remains.  
                                                   
23 For a canonical discussion of this objection to reductive reliabilism see Conee and Feldman 1998. 
24 Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000. 
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 Against this background, the previous section’s proposal, with its appeal to the 
‘proprietary means of justification’ characteristic of each class of ordinary belief,  
emerges as one of a large population of views all requiring non ad hoc grounds for 
treating a favoured typing of belief-forming methods as epistemically relevant. But the 
proposal also generates a new kind of consideration to add to the bit-by-bit account of 
what these non ad hoc grounds might be.25 In the broadest terms, this is because the 
proposal connects the old problem to a store of robust intuitions – intuitions about 
reference and reference failure – which can then be used to argue for the typing of 
methods that predicts and explains them.  
 Let us use the perceptual demonstrative case to add some detail to this line of 
thought. We already have one example involving essayed perceptual demonstrative 
thought in place – Case 1 (you are looking at an orange on the table in front of you…). 
Here are two others:  
 
Case 4 – It seems to you that you are looking at a rectangular thing in the middle distance. You form the 
beliefs you would express by saying ‘That is rectangular’ and ‘That is a few hundred feet away’.  In fact, 
your experience as of a rectangular thing in the middle distance is caused by a freak combination of a speck 
on your glasses, a tree in the middle distance, and a barn on the horizon. 
 
Case 5 It seems to you that you are looking at something round-ish moving slowing in  the shadows. You 
think <It’s round-ish and  slow-moving; maybe it’s a hedgehog>. In fact there is nothing there – the ‘visual 
object’ (in psychologists’ terms26) that you are attending to is just a thickening in the general pattern of 
light and dark.  
 
I take it that, just as Case 1 is a case of aboutness, Cases 4 and 5 are cases of aboutness-
failure: there are no objects the respective beliefs are about; in each case, when you find 
out your mistake you are likely to report it by saying ‘There was nothing there after all’.  
 Now consider the typing of the token method of belief formation involved in Case 
1 that was already supposed in §1: the method is uptake of information delivered through 
an attentional perceptual channel. It is an empirical fact that this belief-forming method 
delivers beliefs that reliably match what the object is like iff it is an ordinary object 
behaving in ways usual for ordinary objects in our environment. As vision scientists often 
put the point, the perceptual system ‘assumes’ that it is dealing with ordinary objects 
behaving ordinarily in an ordinarily-configured space; its algorithms produce generally 
right results as long as this ‘assumption’ is true.27 So if we say that the method of belief-
formation in Cases 1, 4, and 5 is uptake from an attentional channel in which the 
perpetual system has generated an information feed by responding to environmental cues 
in its standard ways (the ways it standardly responds in typical situations we encounter), 
and if we say that the ‘rationally relevant’ circumstances with respect to formation of a 
<That is Φ> belief are those where the attended object behaves in ways that are usual for 
its category in the subject’s environment, we get the results that seem intuitive across the 
range of cases. Case 1 is a case of aboutness because the means by which the beliefs are 
formed eliminates rationally relevant circumstances where the attended object does not 
                                                   
25 For a recent contribution to this account see Comesana 2010. 
26 See for example Pylyshyn 2003 p 173. A ‘visual object’ is anything that is treated as an object by the 
visual system. 
27 Palmer 1999 p 313; Scholl 2002 Intro; Pylyshyn 2003 §3.1.1. 
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have the relevant properties. Cases 4 and 5 involve aboutness failure because, given that 
the attended visual objects are not ordinary (they are not members of the category of 
ordinary objects; they are ‘things’ whose standard behaviours diverge wildly from what is 
standard for ordinary things), it will in fact be a matter of luck if a means of belief 
formation that rests on algorithms that suppose ordinariness get their properties right.  
In contrast, if we had said just that the method is uptake from perception, we 
would not even have got the result that Case 1 is a case of aboutness. For mere uptake 
from a perceptual link is not a reliable means of generating beliefs that match objects in 
the environment (think about how unreliable are our guesses of the properties of objects 
in unattended peripheral vision – objects from which we are, nevertheless, receiving 
perceptual information). And if we said that the method was uptake from an attentional  
perceptual link with an ordinary object, the beliefs in Cases 4 and 5 would have counted 
as not formed by the same method as those in Case 1, so as not justified the same way, so 
we would not have end up with an account of aboutness-fixing in Case 1 which also 
explains why aboutness fails in Cases 4 and 5.  
 Of course, this brief discussion does not close off all possible alternative typings 
of the token methods by which various beliefs are formed. But I think I have said enough 
to show how the connection between epistemology and the theory of reference that I have 
proposed brings a new kind of consideration to addressing this traditional epistemological 
question. 
 I shall close the section by saying a little about the impact of REFERENCE AND 
JUSTIFICATION on right accounts of what I have called ‘description-based thought’ – the 
kind of thought illustrated by Case 3 on p2.  
Here, again, REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION generates a blueprint for accounts of 
how aboutness is fixed: a body of description-based beliefs is about the object, if there is 
one, upon which its proprietary means of justification converges: the object whose 
properties the subject will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely lucky to get right in 
forming a body of beliefs by gathering together all the <…is Φ> information for which 
she finds rationally-securing justification for believing <The Ψ is Φ>.  
Though it may not be apparent at first glance, this is a radical departure from 
extant accounts of how description-based aboutness fixing works. Extant accounts treat 
description-based aboutness-fixing as ‘satisfactional’: the object the beliefs are about is 
the satisfier of the aboutness-fixing description.28 But in the REFERENCE AND 
JUSTIFICATION framework, the mechanism of aboutness-fixing for description-based 
beliefs is not satisfactional. Rather, according to this framework, there is descriptively 
mediated aboutness where (a) a body of beliefs is justified by using a description to 
harvest information, and (b) this means of justification converges on some particular 
thing. In many cases, the thing on which description-based justification converges will 
also be the satisfier of the relevant description. But description-based aboutness may 
converge on an object that is not the description’s satisfier. And it may fail to converge 
even when the description is satisfied.  
Here are two examples illustrating these possibilities: 
 
Case 6 X, the now aged head of a manufacturing company, likes to boast to his underlings about ‘the 
gizmo that started it all’, with strong suggestions that he was himself this thing’s inventor. The underlings 
                                                   
28 See for example Evans 1982 pp. 35-6; Campbell 2002 pp 24-5;  Jeshion 2004; Goodman 2014. 
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introduce a descriptive name ‘Gizmo’ with aboutness-fixing description <X’s most successful early 
invention>, and use X’s utterances (‘Ah, that was the year that the gizmo that started it all really took off’ 
etc.) and the company’s financial history to try to work out which of the firm’s early patents Gizmo was. (Y 
suggests that Gizmo was the initial version of the firm’s famous self-setting rat trap; Z that it was the jet-
fuel valve from which the firm made a lot of money in its early days; and so on.) In fact, though there is an 
invention that enabled the firm to get on its feet, X was not its inventor: the firm’s early patents were all 
bought for almost nothing from an unworldly individual who died an obscure emeritus professor in a 
university town. 
 
Case 7 ‘Geraint the Blue Bard’ was used for over a century as a name for the otherwise unidentified 
author of a series of songs in medieval Welsh, dealing with mythical themes, and employing medieval 
metres. Rival factions of scholars used evidence from the texts to argue for competing hypotheses about 
Geraint’s life (that he was a minor aristocrat; that he was a priest). However, in 1956 the ‘Blue Bard’ songs 
were shown to be the work of notorious nineteenth century forger Edward Williams. 
 
I take it that there are reasonably clear intuitive verdicts about each of these cases. In 
Case 6, the underlings’ ‘Gizmo’ thoughts are, all along, about the invention they 
eventually uncover, even though this thing does not satisfy the aboutness-mediating 
description. In contrast, Case 7 is a case of aboutness-failure, even though the aboutness-
mediating description is satisfied. Let us see how the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION 
framework generates each of these results. 
 Consider Case 6 first. In this case, the underlings are justifying their ‘Gizmo’ 
beliefs by examining the company’s financial records and X’s memoirs, looking for 
evidence for <X’s most successful early invention was Φ> claims. In the informational 
environment in which the investigation is taking place, pursuit of this justificatory 
procedure generates a body of beliefs which reliably get right the properties of a specific 
invention for which X was not in fact responsible. Given REFRENCE AND JUSTIFICATION, 
the underlings’ ‘Gizmo’ beliefs are about this thing, even though it does not satisfy the 
description around which their justificatory strategy is based.   
 Now consider Case 7, and consider how scholars operating before the discovery 
of the forgery would have justified specific ‘Geraint’ beliefs. Here is one plausible 
scenario. Scholar Y gathers, painstakingly, textual evidence for the claims that Geraint 
never left Wales, and was educated across a wide range of disciplines and up to 
proficiency in a wide range of languages. She consults authoritative historical sources  
which say that in ninth century Wales this kind of education was available only at 
Carmarthen. She concludes that this is where Geraint was educated. Given the level of 
epistemic responsibility she has exercised, we should allow that Y’s conclusion is 
rational. Yet if Edward Williams in fact was educated at Carmarthen, then as far as the 
justification for Y’s belief is concerned this will be a mere matter of luck! And, given the 
story of the ‘Geraint’ ballads, this result generalises: given their justificatory strategy, it 
would have been a matter of spectacular chance had the scholars ended up with bodies of 
‘Geraint’ beliefs that even approximately matched what Edward Williams was like. So, 
given REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION, the scholar’s ‘Geraint’ beliefs were not about 
Williams, even though he satisfied the description they associated with the name.29  
 
§3 Objections and replies 
                                                   
29 I discuss descriptively mediated aboutness in much more detail in Dickie 2015 ch 6-7. 
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The first section of this paper argued for a principle connecting aboutness and 
what I have called ‘justificatory convergence’: a body of ordinary beliefs is about the 
object, if there is one, upon which its proprietary means of justification converges. §2 
showed how this principle both provides a blueprint for a new account of the aboutness 
of our ordinary beliefs, and promise new avenues for accounts of how our most basic 
beliefs are justified. This section considers some of the objections and requests for further 
detail that I anticipate this proposal might provoke. Here are the objections I shall 
discuss, in the order in which they appear: 
 
1 The objection from the observation that there can be aboutness without justified belief 
2 The objection from the appearance of circularity 
3 The objection to appeals to intuitions about cases 
4 The objection from the incompleteness of the argument for the right-to-left direction of 
the biconditional 
 
I should stress that I am not attempting a clean sweep of potential objections. Rather, 1-4 
are what I take to be the objections that are most urgent and/or illuminating. I have tried 
to explain and discuss the objections in such a way that each subsection that follows may 
be read alone, or the set may be read in any order. 
 
3.1 The objection from the observation that there can be aboutness without justified 
belief 
  
  The first objection can be brought out using cases like this: 
 
Case 8 You are looking at an ordinary object visible to you only as a speck on the horizon. Since your 
perceptual link is not delivering any macroscopic property information, you are not forming any <That is 
Φ> beliefs. <I wonder what that is> you think. 
 
Case 9 You have been told by someone you have every reason to believe that you have been given a drug 
which will distort your perceptions of every object you encounter. So, though in fact you are just sitting 
there looking at an orange on the table in front of you, and receiving a mundane, chemically unenhanced 
stream of information, you are prudently holding back from forming beliefs by uptake from this 
information stream. You think to yourself <I wonder what it’s really like>.  
 
The objector argues as follows. ‘Each of these is a case of aboutness. But the current 
proposal cannot explain why: it explains aboutness only for justified beliefs, so provides 
no reason to say that the beliefs in Cases 8 and 9 are about anything. The current proposal 
is, therefore (obviously!) too narrow: it treats aboutness as dependent on a feature 
(justification) that many beliefs about particulars do not have.’ 
 I shall take it that the observation from which the objection takes its rise is right: 
in Case 8 you are thinking about the thing on the horizon; in Case 9 about the thing right 
in front of you. But, contra the objector, this is not a strike against the proposal of §1. 
Rather, it forces a clarification: the embedded conditional in REFERENCE AND 
JUSTIFICATION must be read counterfactually. An aboutness-fixing relation does its 
aboutness-fixing work by making available a means of justification such that if the 
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subject were to form a body of beliefs whose rationality was secured by this means, the 
subject would be unlucky if these beliefs did not match the object and not merely lucky if 
they did. This condition may be met regardless of whether the subject actually has any 
such beliefs. And it is met in both Cases 8 and 9.  
In Case 8, you have an attentional link with the object which is not in fact 
delivering information of the kind that serves as input to our bodies of <that> belief: your 
attention is locked to the object, but you are not receiving any signal as to its shape, size, 
colour, or even its distance away. Since there is no such information being delivered, you 
are not forming any <That is Φ> beliefs at all, let alone any justified ones. But if the 
situation were to evolve in such a way that you did start receiving this type of information 
through the attentional perceptual link – if the distance between you and the object 
closed, and the attentional link began delivering information of the kind that does trigger 
formation of <that> beliefs – you would be unlucky if the resulting beliefs did not match 
the object at the other end of the channel, and not merely lucky if they did.  
Similarly, in Case 9, the strong evidence for the claim that your perceptual system 
is not working reliably leaves you unable to justify beliefs by uptake from the 
information your attentional perceptual feed is delivering. But, once again, this fact does 
not undermine the crucial counterfactual: if the barrier to justification were removed 
without disrupting your attentional link, so that you were in a position to form <that> 
beliefs justified by uptake from the information the perceptual link delivers, you would 
be unlucky if the resulting beliefs did not match the attended object, and not merely lucky 
if they did.  
In terms of the telescope analogy from §2, the point with respect to both cases is 
just that an aboutness-fixing relation is a relation that secures a kind of focus, and a 
telescope might be focussed on an object even though it is not in fact currently delivering 
any information, or even if it is delivering information, but the recipient of the signal is, 
for whatever reason, holding back from compiling this information into a report. 
 
3.2 The objection from the appearance of circularity 
 
The second objection concerns an apparent threat of circularity. To see how the 
threat arises, consider the following line of thought: 
 
1 A means of belief-formation counts as justification-conferring partly in virtue of 
tending towards the formation of true beliefs. (This is a version of the claim that 
justification is truth-conducive, endorsed at pp. 3-5.) 
 
2 A means of forming true beliefs is a means of forming beliefs which tend to match the 
properties of the object they are about. (This is a version of the connection between 
aboutness and truth endorsed on p. 5.) 
 
1 and 2  entail 3: 
 
3 A means of belief-formation counts as justification-conferring partly in virtue of 
tending towards the formation of beliefs that tend to match the properties of the object 
they are about. 
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But according to the proposal defended in §§1-2, aboutness is itself explained in terms of 
justificatory convergence:  
 
4 What makes a body of beliefs about a specific object is that it is the object whose 
properties the associated means of justification tends to get right. 
 
And it is now tempting – or at least, the objector finds it tempting – to put 3 and 4 
together into the strikingly uninformative 5: 
 
5 What makes a body of beliefs about a specific object is partly the fact that it is the 
object whose properties tend to be got right by a means of belief formation that tends to 
get its properties right.  
 
 Now, obviously if the proposal reduces to the obviously circular and 
uninformative 5, it deserves nobody’s attention. But fortunately, though it would be a 
longer job to establish the details, it is relatively easy to bring out where the reduction 
fails. The proposal might30 entail 5. But to point out that a proposal entails a circular 
claim is one thing; to show that it reduces to this claim another. And when we look at 1 – 
5 bearing this difference in mind, it is in fact clear enough where the opportunity to resist 
the reduction arises. For 5 is only a ‘partly in virtue of’ claim. To suggest that entailing it 
renders the proposal viciously circular is to ignore a possibility that the  1 – 5 line of 
thought leaves wide open: the possibility that there is more to say about what makes our 
ordinary means of belief-formation justification-conferring than is made explicit at 1 and 
3 and, therefore, more to say about what makes a body of beliefs about a particular than 
is made explicit by 5, and that, when this extra detail is added, the appearance of 
circularity will fall away.   
 This response is incomplete without an account of what the ‘something more to 
say’ actually is. It is obviously not possible to canvas all potential answers to this 
question, so I shall rest with sketching my own.  
 My own view is that the means of belief formation for our ordinary beliefs 
ultimately owe their justification-conferring status to the fact that they are guided by 
motivational states of the subject. To see the very general idea, think of what justifies the 
moves made by a skilled practitioner seeking to achieve some practical goal, for example, 
a skilled archer shooting at a target. The archer’s adjustments as she prepares to let fly are 
‘justified’ in that they are guided by her target-hitting intention, and are reliable 
generators of this intention’s fulfilment. And this is a special case of a kind of positive 
normative status that applies in general to goal-directed behaviours that are apt to their 
guiding motivational states: a behaviour is ‘justified’ in this sense iff it is guided by a 
motivational state of the subject, and is a reliable means to this state’s fulfilment. I 
suggest that the most basic story about justification for our ordinary beliefs is a 
‘practical’ justification story of this general form: the mind needs to think about things 
outside itself; formation of bodies of ordinary beliefs in response to incoming 
                                                   
30 This depends on the properties of the x makes y the case relation. What I am about to say does not 
depend on whether the entailment holds.  
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information is a behaviour that is guided by this need and – because we are naturally 
skilled cognitive agents – is a reliable means to this need’s fulfilment.  
 Against this background, we indeed have something more to say about what fixes 
aboutness than the blatantly circular 5. This ‘something more’ takes seriously the fact that 
formation of a body of ordinary beliefs is an information-marshalling activity. Like other 
activities, this information-marshalling has a goal: we are trying to achieve cognitive 
focus on things outside the mind. The information-marshalling strategy associated with a 
specific body of ordinary beliefs has positive normative status, and confers positive 
normative status on the beliefs it generates, because it is guided by a motivational state of 
the subject – the mind’s need to achieve cognitive focus – and is a reliable means to this 
need’s fulfilment. The body of beliefs is about a specific object iff this means of belief 
formation in fact is focussed on the object, making the object the unique thing whose 
properties the subject will tend to get right by forming beliefs justified in this way. 
 This sketch of how our most basic belief-forming methods confer justification 
perforce leaves many questions unaddressed. But I hope to have said enough to give 
someone tempted by the circularity objection pause for thought.31 
 
3.3 The objection from illicit appeals to intuition 
 
 The third objection is that the argument of §1 is guilty of illicit appeals to 
intuitions about cases. We can imagine the objector arguing like this: ‘There were 
decades in living philosophical memory when this kind of carry-on – describing cases; 
declaring intuitive verdicts; treating these verdicts as data; arguing for philosophical 
theories on the basis that they explain these data – was so commonplace as to be, perhaps, 
excusable. But it is no longer permissible simply to elevate one’s own knee-jerk 
responses to the status of “ordinary person’s intuition”. Where data as to this kind of 
intuition are admissible at all, they must be gathered by scientifically respectable means: 
by the conduct of experiments which establish which way philosophically 
uncontaminated intuitions actually lean. This paper repeatedly appeals to purported 
“intuitive” judgements about cases, without even a gesture towards scientifically 
respectable evidence for the claim that such intuitions exist. It is, therefore, guilty of 
methodological crimes with which nobody should expect to get away in these enlightened 
times.’32 
 I take it that, in general, someone using intuitions about cases to do philosophical 
work has three options – two extremes, and a middle way. The first extreme option is to 
claim that the purported intuitions in fact do stand to the philosophical proposal as data to 
theory. Anyone taking this option incurs an obligation to show that the intuitions in fact 
are sufficiently widespread and theory-uncontaminated to play this role. The second 
extreme option is to maintain that the philosophical proposal is in fact motivated from 
                                                   
31 I develop this view in much more detail in Ch 3 of Dickie 2015. The view treats achieving cognitive 
focus as an ‘apt performance’ in the sense of Sosa 2012 – a performance that is a reliable generator of 
fulfilment of its guiding motivational state. In the terms proposed by Miracchi 2015 p. 30, this is a ‘direct’ 
virtue proposal – cognitive focus is an achievement generated by the subject’s competence to achieve it. I 
am grateful to Thomas Hofweber for his careful criticism of this general treatment of the circularity worry 
in Hofweber (forthcoming). Dickie (forthcoming) replies. 
32 For wide-raging criticism of appeal to intuitions in philosophy see Cappelen 2012. For recent discussion 
of such appeals in the theory of reference see Jackman 2009; Genone and Lombrozo 2012. 
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first principles, and that the discussion of cases has the status of worked examples which 
illustrate how it is applied. If this is how discussion of cases fits into the overall narrative, 
the pressure to defend the data-like credentials of verdicts about cases falls away. 
 Against the background of these extremes, the ‘middle way’ option emerges as 
comprising a continuum of intermediate positions, running from the more example-
driven (closer to the first extreme, but with some admixture of ‘from first principles’ 
motivation) to the less example-driven (a central role played by ‘from first principles’ 
motivation, but purported intuitions about cases accorded some evidential weight).  
 I intend the discussion of this paper to be located at the less example-driven end 
of this ‘middle way’ continuum. I have motivated the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION 
framework from first principles. But I have also leant a little on intuitive verdicts about 
cases. Perhaps there are anti-intuition crusaders who will set their faces against placing 
even this comparatively meagre weight on verdicts about cases without the experimental 
work necessary to consolidate their status as data. To such a determined opponent, I can 
only point out the flat-footedness of the core verdicts for which he or she would be 
demanding experimental validation: the verdicts that the beliefs in Cases 1 – 3 are about 
the orange in front of you, the bearer of ‘Aneurin Bevan’ as it is used by your informant, 
and the author of the ‘Tremulous Hand’ glosses respectively. I have taken it that there is 
an intuitive sense of ‘about’ which is reflected in these verdicts, and proposed an account 
of how this intuitive aboutness is fixed. I defy a reader to claim, hand on heart, that he or 
she needs an experiment to establish that the intuitive verdicts of aboutness are there to 
be explained.   
 
3.4 The objection from the incompleteness of the argument 
 
 The final objection is a reminder that the argument of §1 is incomplete. Recall  
the outline of the argument for the right-to-left direction of the REFERENCE AND 
JUSTIFICATION biconditional: 
 
1 Suppose that S is maintaining a body of ordinary beliefs whose proprietary means of 
justification converges on o, so that if S forms only <α is Φ> beliefs whose rationality is 
secured by this means, either o is Φ, or the situation is rationally irrelevant. 
 
2 There are three cases.  
(a) The beliefs are about some o* other than o.  
(b) They are about o.  
(c) They are about nothing. 
 
3 The beliefs are not about some o* other than o. 
 
4 The beliefs are not about nothing. 
 
So 
5 The beliefs are about o. 
 
Therefore 
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6 Where proprietary justification for a body of ordinary beliefs converges on o, the 
beliefs are about o. 
 
The discussion of §1 left the argument for 4 in rough and ready form: I said only that to 
suppose 4 false is to suppose that there is some extra condition on aboutness above and 
beyond justificatory convergence (we already know that justificatory convergence is a 
necessary condition on aboutness – this is established by the argument of pp 5-6) and it is 
hard to see what explanatory role this condition might play. 
 To reach a full-dress version of this line of thought, we shall ask what the extra 
condition might be. Let us suppose, again, that 4 is false, and pay closer attention to the 
details of what follows: 
 
(i) Suppose that 4 is false: the beliefs are about nothing. 
(ii) Suppose also that for some Φ,  S has a rational <α is Φ> belief.  
 
Since the belief is about nothing, it is not true. But TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION entails that 
where a rational belief is not true, the subject’s mistake traces to some rational-
irrelevance-producing factor. So (i) and (ii) entail (iii):  
 
(iii) The actual situation is rationally irrelevant to formation of the belief: it is a situation 
in which the belief fails to be true in virtue of the presence of some factor against which 
the subject is not rationally required to be on his or her guard. 
 
Having arrived at (iii), it is tempting to try to argue that, given 1, there can be no such 
factor, and that the supposition at (i) has, therefore, been reduced to absurdity. 
Unfortunately, this tempting strategy does not stand up to scrutiny. For one way for a 
circumstance to be rationally irrelevant is for it to involve hidden aboutness-failure. So to 
push through the tempting line of thought, we would already need to be supposing that 
the situation as described at 1 does not involve aboutness failure, which is what we are 
trying to establish.  
 However, though this tempting line of thought must be abandoned, ordinary 
beliefs have a property that is going to let us have something nearby: ordinary beliefs are 
existentially committing; if it is rational for a subject to hold an ordinary belief, it is also 
rational for the subject to hold the corresponding existential generalisation. (This is just 
the claim that if it is rational to believe <That is Φ>, <NN is Φ>, or <Tremulous Hand is 
Φ>, it is rational to believe <Something is Φ> too.)33 This claim about the relationship 
between ordinary beliefs and their existential generalisations can be reformulated as a 
claim about rational relevance: 
  
(iv) If a situation is irrelevant to formation of the belief that <α is Φ>, it is also irrelevant 
to formation of the corresponding belief that <Something is Φ>.  
 
                                                   
33 Note that this is a claim about ordinary beliefs only. It leaves it open that there might be <…is Φ> beliefs 
– for example, beliefs ‘about’ fictional characters – which are not existentially committing. 
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(Suppose that (iv) is false. Then, focussing on the perceptual demonstrative case, a stream 
of justification could make it rational to believe <That is Φ> (eliminating all relevant 
belief-not-true circumstances), while leaving it irrational to believe <Something is Φ> 
(because there are circumstances where nothing is Φ that must be ruled out if it is to be 
rational to believe <Something is Φ> but which did not have to be ruled out to secure the 
rationality of the <That is Φ> belief).)    
 Combining (i)-(iv) we get (v): 
 
(v)  If justification converges but aboutness fails, then, for all Φ, if S has a rational belief 
that <α is Φ>, the situation is irrelevant to the formation of the belief that <Something is 
Φ>. 
 
And now we can ask the question we wanted to ask at (iii) but had to drop for fear of 
circularity: what might the factor generating rational irrelevance be? 
Now, a rational belief that <Something is Φ> is a belief formed in a way that 
manifests competence at forming such beliefs (a belief formed in such a way that, unless 
the situation involves some rational-irrelevance-generating factor, it will count as 
knowledge)34. If such a competence-manifesting belief does not count as knowledge, this 
can only be because the situation involves some factor that renders the test for Φ-
instantiation that the subject is deploying insensitive, so that, though in general this test 
tends to get things right, in the situation in which the belief is formed a positive result 
with respect to this test does not indicate Φ-instantiation at all.  
 In general, there are two kinds of factor that might be responsible for this kind of 
insensitivity in an otherwise reliable test, one more unusual than the other. In the less 
unusual kind of case, the test is getting it right with respect to the presence of an object (a 
potential Φ-instantiator), but wrong with respect to this object’s Φ-ness or not. (For 
example, this is what happens when you see an object through a distorting window, 
seeing a round thing as square.) In the more unusual case, the test is giving a positive 
result for Φ-instantiation when there is not an object there  at all. (For example, imagine 
that your visual system is producing an experience indistinguishable by you from an 
experience of a cubical thing, when in fact the appearance of cubicality is cooked up out 
of fence-wires crossing in the foreground against shadows in the forest behind.) But it is 
built into the description of the situation at 1 that it is not the second, very unusual, kind 
of factor that is at issue. 1 stipulates that the tests for property instantiation you are 
deploying are responsive to the properties of some particular object: given 1, if there is a 
concealed factor leading S astray as to whether anything is Φ, it is not a factor to do with 
whether there is anything out there: S is deploying a test for Φ-instantiation which is 
(rightly) picking up the presence of an object (a potential Φ-instantiator), but giving a 
false positive as to this thing’s Φ-ness. So we can move from (v) to 
 
(vi)  If justification converges on o, but aboutness fails then, for all Φ, if S has a rational 
belief that <α is Φ>, the situation involves a factor that renders the test for Φ-
instantiation S is deploying insensitive to whether o is Φ. 
                                                   
34 I intend ‘manifest’ here in the sense of Sosa 2015 ch 2. 
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And now we can use (vi) to generate an account of the extra condition on aboutness 
which must be met for a case of justificatory convergence to be a case of aboutness too: 
the extra condition is just the non-obtaining of the condition under which a case of 
justificatory convergence is a case of aboutness failure. A case of justificatory 
convergence is a case of aboutness failure only if there is no Φ such that (a) the subject 
has proprietary rationality-securing justification for believing <α is Φ>, and (b) the test 
for Φ-instantiation that generates this justification is in fact getting o’s Φ-ness right. So a 
case of justificatory convergence is a case of aboutness iff there is some Φ for which (a) 
and (b) are met. So we have arrived at (vii):  
 
(vii) A body of ordinary beliefs is about the object, if there is one, upon which its 
justification converges as long as the proprietary means of justification is also providing 
the subject with at least one rational belief that matches what this object is like.  
 
 Now, this extra condition is not, strictly speaking, absurd. But I take it that it is 
obviously hopeless.35 What possible virtue could there be to the suggestion that thinking 
about an ordinary object requires knowing one – any one – of its macroscopic properties? 
None except from the point of view of an inconvincible opponent looking for any way to 
wiggle out of the conclusion of §1: the conclusion that there is aboutness iff there is 
justificatory convergence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The aim of this paper has been to establish a principle connecting two fields of 
inquiry: the ‘aboutness fixing’ part of the theory of reference, and traditional ‘S knows 
that p’ epistemology. According to the framework for accounts of aboutness-fixing built 
around this principle, the aboutness of our ordinary beliefs is a kind of focus: a body of 
ordinary beliefs is about the object, if there is one, upon which its characteristic means of 
justification converges; the object whose properties the subject will be unlucky to get 
wrong and not merely lucky to get right in forming beliefs whose rationality is secured in 
this way. §1 argued for this principle. In the broadest terms, the suggestion was that the 
principle brings out the significance for accounts of aboutness-fixing of the fact that 
justification is truth-conducive. §2 showed how the principle offers both a new blueprint 
for accounts of aboutness-fixing for our ordinary beliefs, and a new source of 
considerations to bring to bear on traditional epistemological debates. §3 considered 
objections and replies. Though I do not take myself to have answered all the questions the 
reader might have about the proposal I have made, I do hope to have said enough to 
render the claim I set out to defend not implausible: there is an essential connection 
between epistemology and the theory of reference; a connection through which influence 
flows irresistibly from each field of inquiry to the other. 
 
                                                   
35 It is important to distinguish the italicized condition in (vii) from the less implausible claim that thought 
about an object requires a rational belief that gets some special one of its properties right: (vii) makes 
knowing just one, any one, of an object’s ordinary macroscopic properties a necessary condition on 
thinking about it.  
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